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DISPUTES AND THE NEED FOR  
COURT-COMMISSIONED INDEPENDENT 
EXPERTS 
Michael J. McDermott* 
Abstract: In complex environmental disputes the International Court of 
Justice should utilize its investigatory powers to identify long-term envi-
ronmental impacts before reaching legal conclusions. Pulp Mills on the Riv-
er Uruguay highlights the ICJ’s current reluctance to utilize its investigatory 
powers—instead, the court relies on the parties’ contentious scientific 
submissions and fails to verify all potential environmental harms. In so do-
ing, the court fails to conform to the international principle of sustainable 
development. This Comment identifies the Rules of Court and past cases 
that demonstrate that justices have the power to question expert witnesses 
and request independent investigation when evaluating questionable or 
incomplete scientific evidence. Additionally, this Comment argues that 
such ICJ-ordered independent investigations will bolster growing interna-
tional support for the principle of sustainable development. 
Introduction 
 On May 4, 2006, the Argentine Republic applied to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 
violated procedures required by a 1975 bilateral agreement (Statute) 
when it authorized the construction of two pulp mills on the River 
Uruguay.1 The case is the second environmental dispute at the ICJ and 
highlights a need for the ICJ to examine its mechanisms for substantiat-
ing scientific evidence that is clearly prejudiced and disputed.2 In this 
case, the ICJ ultimately held Uruguay liable for violating the Statute, 
but nevertheless refused to grant Argentina any remedy; the majority 
                                                                                                                      
* Michael J. McDermott is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, ¶ 67 (Apr. 20, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. 
2 See id. ¶¶ 166–168; Clodagh Boyle, Uruguay Prevails over Argentina in International Court 
of Justice in Landmark Environmental Dispute, Foley Hoag (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www. foley 
hoag.com/NewsCenter/PressCenter/2010/04/21/Foley_Hoag_Uruguay_Prevails. aspx. 
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determined that because of discrepancies in the scientific evidence 
submitted by the parties, Argentina had failed to prove that Uruguay’s 
actions negatively impacted the river.3 
 This Comment criticizes the ICJ for drawing legal conclusions 
based on insufficient evidence and it recommends that the ICJ utilize its 
ability to compel sworn expert testimony and commission independent 
enquiry to substantiate and analyze disputed data in future complex 
environmental disputes.4 
 Part I of this Comment provides background information regard-
ing the Pulp Mill dispute, including Uruguay’s economic motivations 
and Argentina’s Statute-based expectations. Part II reviews the ICJ’s 
analysis and conclusions, focusing on the justices’ attempt to examine 
and understand the diverging and disputed scientific data. Finally, Part 
III analyzes the ICJ’s hesitation to use non-party expert data and ex-
plain the benefits of the ICJ’s investigatory powers in complex envi-
ronmental disputes. 
I. Background 
 In 1961, Argentina and Uruguay recognized the River Uruguay as 
their international border and expressed the intent to jointly manage 
the utilization and biological health of the river’s resources.5 In 1975, 
the parties adopted a bilateral statute to establish “joint machinery” 
allowing “optimum and rational” use of the River Uruguay.6 The pre-
sent dispute arose because Uruguay operated independently as it be-
gan to authorize construction of two pulp mill processing plants.7 
 In 2003, Uruguay approved Spanish company ENCE’s plans to 
construct a mill near the city of Fray Bentos.8 Then, in February of 
2005, it granted a Finnish company, Oy Metsä-Botina AB, permission to 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶¶ 275–280. 
4 See generally Rules of Court, arts. 50, 62, 67, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 91, 123, 129, 131. 
5 See Treaty Concerning the Boundary Constituted by the River Uruguay, Arg.-Uru., Apr. 
7, 1961, 635 U.N.T.S. 98, 104–06 [hereinafter Treaty]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. 
v. Uru.), Judgment, ¶ 26 (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
135/15877.pdf. 
6 Statute of the River Uruguay, Arg.-Uru., Feb. 26, 1975, 1295 U.N.T.S. 340, 340. 
7 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶¶ 106, 107. 
8 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Order of 13 July 2006, 2006 I.C.J. 113, ¶ 5. ENCE 
halted the construction of its mill in October, 2006, officially citing physical problems with 
the location of the mill, but it is thought that ENCE wanted to avoid the growing public pro-
tests and Argentina’s opposition to the mills. Chris Lang, ENCE Cancels Pulp Mill in Uruguay, 
Pulp Inc. (Oct. 2, 2006), http://pulpinc.wordpress.com/2006/10/02/ence-cancels-pulp-
mill-in-uruguay/. 
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construct a mill and a private port, known as the Botina Mill, in the 
same area.9 
 Argentina first raised concerns about the Botina Mill in June 2005 
and requested a halt in construction until the two nations and the Stat-
ute’s bi-national oversight organization—the Administrative Commis-
sion of the River Uruguay (CARU)—could determine the environmental 
impact of the project.10 Uruguay, however, continued to move towards 
final project approval, despite Argentina’s objections and ongoing nego-
tiations.11 During this time period, locals began to grow increasingly 
concerned with the environmental impact of the pulp mill and organ-
ized intermittent, but large, protests throughout 2006 and 2007.12 
 Uruguay’s economic motivations for the project included the po-
tential for foreign investment, exemplified by the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) investment of $170 million in the project.13 The 
IFC stated that the Botina mill, as Uruguay’s largest foreign investment 
project in history, would have “economic, environmental, and social 
benefits” by creating thousands of local jobs, providing cleaner energy 
resources, and treating wastewater.14 The IFC acknowledged that Ar-
gentina was concerned with environmental harms, but emphasized that 
the IFC’s own environmental impact study had concluded that the mill 
provided an optimal use of the river with insignificant negative envi-
ronmental impact.15 
 Due to Uruguay’s independent authorizations and failure to com-
municate sufficient scientific and project information, CARU was un-
able to complete a preliminary environmental impact assessment and 
bilateral talks failed.16 After these Statute-based mechanisms failed, Ar-
gentina took the dispute to the ICJ.17 Argentina argued that Uruguay 
violated the Statute by failing to follow the requisite notification and 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2006 I.C.J. ¶ 6. 
10 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶¶ 41, 42. 
11 See id. ¶ 42. 
12 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Order of 23 Jan. 2007, ¶ 8 ( Jan. 23, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/13615.pdf. Large protests blocked interna-
tional bridges, allegedly costing Uruguay hundreds of millions of dollars in trade and tour-
ism. See id. 
13 See Press Release, International Finance Corporation, IFC and MIGA Board Approves 
Orion Pulp Mill in Uruguay: 2,500 Jobs to be Created, No Environmental Harm (Nov. 21, 
2006), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/media.nsf/content/SelectedPressRelease?Open 
Document&UNID=F76F15A5FE7735918525722D0058F472. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 97. 
17 See id. ¶ 82. 
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environmental impact research procedures.18 It also argued that the 
pulp mill violated substantive environmental standards expressed in 
both the Statute and other international treaties.19 In contrast, Uruguay 
argued that the Statute simply provided an optional mechanism to as-
sist cooperation, which was unnecessary because the countries had ini-
tiated bilateral negotiations pursuant to other agreements.20 Uruguay 
maintains that the pulp mill does not violate any substantive environ-
mental obligations, as the IFC’s and their own research does not indi-
cate negative environmental impacts.21 
II. Discussion 
 In 2010, the ICJ held that Uruguay violated the Statute’s proce-
dural obligations.22 However, the court did not require Uruguay to pay 
compensation or close the pulp mill because Argentina failed to prove 
a violation of the Statute’s substantive obligations to protect the river 
environment and biological organisms.23 
A. Treaty History and Scope 
 The obligations between Uruguay and Argentina were first articu-
lated in a 1961 bilateral treaty recognizing that the River Uruguay 
formed the shared border between the two countries, and expressing 
general principles of cooperation for the utilization and protection of 
the river’s resources.24 The agreement declared the nations’ intent to 
develop a regime that covers, among other things, the “conservation of 
living resources” and to prevent water pollution.25 This regime was 
formalized by the Statute in 1975, which established joint machinery 
for the optimum and rational use of the river in observance of the par-
ties’ rights and obligations arising from the Statute and other interna-
tional treaties and agreements.26 
 The Statute also established procedural mechanisms requiring en-
vironmental impact studies, environmental monitoring and bi-party 
                                                                                                                      
18 See id. 
19 See id. ¶ 56. 
20 See id. ¶¶ 84, 125. 
21 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2006 I.C.J ¶¶ 44, 45. 
22 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, ¶¶ 275–280 (Apr. 20, 
2010), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. 
23 See id. ¶ 276. 
24 Treaty, supra note 5. 
25 Id. arts. 1, 7(e), 7(f). 
26 Statute of the River Uruguay, Arg.-Uru., Feb. 26, 1975, 1295 U.N.T.S. 340, 340. 
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communication through the bi-national CARU, and also outlined sub-
stantive river utilization and environmental obligations.27 With regard 
to the present dispute, the parties have interpreted the Statute differ-
ently, with Uruguay arguing that it limits the court’s examination to 
only those claims concerning the pulp mill’s impact on the quality and 
biological organisms of the river.28 Argentina reads the Statute to in-
clude general principles of international environmental law, allowing 
evaluation of the mill’s impact on air quality, vistas, and sound.29 
 In the instant case the ICJ dismissed air, noise, and visual pollution 
claims because such claims would not have been evaluated by CARU; 
however, the court recognized that both the ICJ and CARU could con-
sider the international principle of sustainable development.30 The Sta-
tute and CARU were established to oversee environmental and utiliza-
tion issues related to “any change in the ecological balance and to 
control pests and other harmful factors in the river,” limiting CARU’s 
and the ICJ’s parallel jurisdiction to disputes regarding the environ-
mental impact of new river uses.31 
B. Procedural Obligations 
 The justices were in general agreement that Uruguay had violated 
the Statute’s procedural obligations.32 The ICJ held that the Statute re-
quired Uruguay to notify CARU at the initial planning stage of the pulp 
mill projects so that CARU could have the opportunity to make its pre-
liminary environmental impact determination.33 Uruguay’s “initial en-
vironmental authorizations” for each of the mills failed to comply with 
the Statute because CARU was notified only after Uruguay gave its own 
national authorization for the projects.34 Additionally, the information 
Uruguay finally submitted to CARU was considered inadequate as it was 
only a summary of the environmental impact assessment for the never-
completed ENCE mill, and it failed to address the Botina project.35 
 Because CARU could not make a preliminary environmental im-
pact determination, Uruguay was then obligated to initiate a 180-day 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶¶ 90, 91. 
28 See id. ¶ 49. 
29 Id. ¶ 50. 
30 See id. ¶ 52. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. ¶ 282. 
33 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 104. 
34 Id. at ¶ 111. 
35 See id. ¶ 106. 
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negotiation period with Argentina.36 Uruguay claimed that the re-
quirement was met by the parties that created the “High-Level Technical 
Group” (GTAN), which exchanged information and studied the effects 
of the pulp mills.37 The ICJ disagreed, holding that the GTAN meetings 
did not replace the Statute’s procedures and that any dialogue between 
the nations, including GTAN, was frustrated by Uruguay’s final authori-
zation of the construction and operation of the Botina Mill.38 
C. Substantive Obligations 
 Article 40 of the Statute obligates the parties to prevent the “direct 
or indirect introduction by man into the aquatic environment of sub-
stances or energy which have harmful effects.”39 CARU, acting in its 
rule-making and monitoring capacities, defined “harmful effects” as 
those which alter the water quality in a way that prevents any legitimate 
use of the water by harming living resources, human health, or water 
activities.40 Additionally, CARU and the individual states are responsible 
for establishing the environmental and health standards, which in-
cludes setting acceptable levels for pollutants.41 
 To determine if the mill’s impact undermined the Statute’s pur-
pose or violated bilateral and national standards, the ICJ relied on the 
data submitted by the parties.42 The ICJ used the scientific data to con-
clude that Uruguay had acted with due diligence to protect the envi-
ronment and that the mill produced pollutants within the agreed upon 
levels.43 
 The ICJ’s examination of Uruguay’s due diligence and the envi-
ronmental impact of the mill was based only on the data which the ICJ 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Statute of the River Uruguay, 1295 U.N.T.S. at 341; Pulp Mills on the River Uru-
guay, Judgment, ¶ 114. 
37 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 132 (quoting from a press release is-
sued by both Parties on May 31, 2005). 
38 See id. ¶¶ 140, 141, 143. The court held that because Uruguay began building the 
mill during GTAN meetings those negotiations were without purpose. See id. Consequently, 
the ICJ concluded that Uruguay had violated the principle of “good faith” and the Stat-
ute’s requirement that the nations “conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaning-
ful” to allow full cooperation. See id. ¶¶ 143–146. 
39 See id. ¶ 198. 
40 See id. ¶¶ 92, 198. 
41 See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 238 (“[T]here is a CARU stan-
dard which sets a minimum level of dissolved oxygen for the river waters (5.6 mg/L).”). 
42 See id. ¶ 265. Additionally, the court recognized that violation of procedural obliga-
tions does not necessarily indicate that substantive obligations were breached. See id. ¶ 78. 
43 See id. ¶ 236. 
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had already recognized as disputed by the parties.44 Although the par-
ties questioned the models, data collection and interpretations, the ICJ 
stated that it would rely principally on that data, which had been submit-
ted by the parties’ attorneys rather than experts.45 Specifically, based on 
the data provided, the majority determined that there was no evidence 
sufficiently proving that the mill caused river levels of dissolved oxygen, 
phosphorus, phenolic substances, nonylphenols, dioxins, or furans to 
exceed the levels set by CARU or national legislation.46 
 However, the fourteen-justice court was divided on whether the 
data allowed the ICJ to reach such a legal conclusion because there was 
clear disagreement about the evidence submitted and the ability to rely 
on that data.47 The dissenting justices were skeptical of the veracity of 
the scientific evidence submitted by the parties and believed that the 
ICJ should have commissioned its own independent experts to verify 
and investigate the claims of environmental harms.48 
 Argentina claimed that, unlike Uruguay’s environmental impact 
assessment, one conducted with due diligence would have identified 
alternative sites for the mill and recognized the danger that the river’s 
reverse flow at Fray Bentos can trap pollutants.49 Argentina presented 
three-dimensional modeling, which projected that the effects of reverse 
flow at Fray Bentos made the site environmentally unsuitable because 
pollutants would increase in concentration by becoming trapped during 
the summer months.50 Argentina also claimed that Uruguay’s data was 
unpersuasive because it had not sampled enough sites and failed to col-
lect data during crucial summer months when there are reverse flows.51 
The majority, however, did not examine the “scientific and technical 
validity” of Argentina’s model and instead assumed that CARU would 
have recognized, and will continue to monitor, the impact of the river’s 
reverse flow when it sets standards for pollution levels.52 When evaluat-
ing Uruguay’s failure to provide an environmental impact assessment 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. 
45 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 212, 231, 236. 
46 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 237. 
47 See id. ¶ 282; see, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Al-
Khasawneh, J., & Simma, J., dissenting), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
135/15879.pdf. 
48 See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 4 (Al-Khasawneh, J., & Simma, 
J., dissenting). 
49 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 212. 
50 See id. 
51 See Anna Petherick, Science Panel Gives Hope in River-Pollution Dispute, 466 Nature 
911, 911 (Aug. 19, 2010). 
52 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 213. 
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listing alternative sites, the majority refused to analyze technical data 
and simply set the question aside for CARU to monitor further.53 
 Additionally, Argentina claimed that the pulp mill caused the riv-
er’s dissolved oxygen levels to fall below allowed levels.54 Uruguay re-
sponded that Argentina failed to sufficiently prove its claim because 
Argentina’s data measured “demand for oxygen” instead of the actual 
levels of “dissolved oxygen.”55 The ICJ acknowledged this discrepancy 
and decided to ignore Argentina’s data, relying only on research 
funded by the project’s international funding agency, the IFC, which 
indicated that the dissolved oxygen levels met CARU’s standards.56 Ra-
ther than taking the initiative to evaluate the discrepancy in Argentina’s 
data, the ICJ relied on data obtained by a self-interested non-state actor, 
and then concluded that Argentina had failed to provide sufficient evi-
dence.57 
 Similarly, the ICJ dismissed Argentina’s claim that the mill caused 
an algal bloom simply because Argentina was unable to rebut Uruguay’s 
unsubstantiated alternative hypothesis—the actual cause of the algal 
bloom remains unproven.58 Argentina argued that a spike in com-
pounds dispersed by the mill altered the ecological balance of the river, 
thus causing the algal bloom and therefore violating CARU’s require-
ment of preserving the river’s ecological balance.59 Rather than directly 
rebut Argentina’s evidence, Uruguay responded with a hypothesis that 
upstream activities were equally responsible for the algal bloom.60 The 
ICJ, unable to qualify either hypothesis, left the question unanswered 
and held that Argentina had not satisfactorily established that the mill 
was the sole cause of the algal bloom.61 Consequently, on three separate 
legal conclusions regarding the mill’s environmental impact, the ICJ’s 
inability to factually ascertain the veracity of each parties’ data resulted 
in the majority holding that the mill could continue to operate because 
it had not harmed the environment.62 
                                                                                                                      
53 See id. ¶ 214. 
54 See id. ¶ 238. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. ¶ 239. 
57 See id. 
58 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶¶ 248–250. 
59 See id. ¶¶ 201, 248–250. 
60 See id. ¶ 249. 
61 See id. ¶ 250. 
62 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 213, 239, 250. 
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III. Analysis 
 In this dispute, despite rampant allegations that the data had been 
twisted and misconstrued to suit each government’s agenda, the ICJ re-
lied only on the data submitted by the parties.63 The majority indicated 
that the data submitted by the parties was unreliable because it was 
submitted for advocacy purposes, rather than as expert testimony, but 
stated that the justices were still capable of drawing conclusions from 
this data.64 It was also noted that the ICJ would not entertain any discus-
sion of the merits and reliability of the submissions and would rely solely 
on the parties’ scientific data, because reliance on the “factual informa-
tion submitted” has been a long-standing practice of the ICJ.65 
A. Unsubstantiated Data Requires Additional Expert Analysis 
 While it is common for the ICJ to rely on parties’ submissions, the 
ICJ has the power to commission experts to provide additional enquiry 
and opinions or to substantiate a party’s claims.66 Two separate articles 
in the Rules of Court provide mechanisms for the ICJ to call witnesses, 
commission expert testimony, and take steps necessary to clarify any 
information relevant to the dispute.67 Article 62 gives the ICJ the power 
to call witnesses, to require parties to produce evidence or provide fur-
ther explanation, and allows the court to seek other information on its 
own accord.68 The Rules of Court require that experts called to give 
their opinion under Article 62 must swear to the truth and sincerity of 
their statements, and that they will have their opinions questioned by 
the justices and examined by all parties.69 These truth and transparency 
requirements are not imposed on data submitted by attorneys as part of 
their written or oral persuasive argument.70 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, ¶ 166 (Apr. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf; Petherick, supra note 51. 
64 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 167. 
65 Id. ¶ 168. 
66 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶¶ 5–8 (Al-Khasawneh, J., & Simma, 
J., dissenting), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15879.pdf. 
67 See Rules of Court, supra note 4, arts. 62, 67. 
68 See id. art. 62. 
69 See id. 
70 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 7 (Al-Khasawneh, J., & Simma, J., dis-
senting). This is not to say that data provided by parties’ counsel can be untruthful, as 
submissions must be certified and provide factual information, but it is to indicate that the 
Rules apply less rigor to the parties’ submissions as they are seen as part of the parties’ 
arguments and will be scrutinized through the litigation process. See, e.g., Rules of Court, 
supra note 4, art. 58. 
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 Additionally, the ICJ can utilize Article 50 to entrust nonparties to 
carry out an independent enquiry and give expert opinion to clarify 
relevant issues.71 Such independent expert opinions supplement the 
justices with the scientific and technical knowledge that they lack pro-
fessionally.72 Despite the majority’s insinuation that such practices are 
uncommon, the ICJ has previously commissioned independent exter-
nal opinions to examine technical matters and substantiate a party’s 
“fact”-based claims.73 
 The Article 50 mechanism was first utilized by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in Chorzow Factory when the court com-
missioned an expert to assist in calculating appropriate damages.74 On 
their own, the justices were unable to infer from the parties’ submis-
sions what effects the one party’s breach of the agreement had on mar-
ket prices, and therefore they presented that question to an expert.75 
Additionally, the I.C.J. has commissioned experts to substantiate one 
party’s claims and also upon direct request of the parties.76 
 In the Corfu Channel dispute, regarding hostilities between the Brit-
ish Royal Navy and Albania in 1946, the court ordered naval experts 
from three non-party nations to independently investigate the facts, 
including confidential military information, and provide the court with 
a “precise and concrete” opinion regarding weather conditions, visibil-
ity, and the Royal Navy’s knowledge of Albania’s land-mining activi-
ties.77 The court found it necessary to obtain an expert opinion be-
cause the parties contested whether the anchored automatic maritime 
mines caused the damage to the Royal Navy, whether the Albanian 
Government actually knew of the location of the mines, whether the 
Royal Navy’s presence in those waters was lawful, and whether Albanian 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Rules of Court, supra note 4, art. 50. 
72 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶¶ 11, 12 (Al-Khasawneh, J., & Simma, 
J., dissenting). 
73 See, e.g., Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Gulf of Maine), 
Order of 30 Mar. 1984, 1984 I.C.J. 165, ¶ 3; Corfu Channel, Order of 17 Dec. 1948, 1947–
1948 I.C.J. 124, ¶ 1. 
74 See The Factory at Chorzow, Order of 13 Sept. 1928, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, 99, 
100–01. 
75 See id. The expert findings were never presented to the court or relied on by the jus-
tices because the parties settled. See Factory at Chorzow, Order of 25 May 1929, 1929 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 19, 10, 13, 15. 
76 See, e.g., Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 165, ¶ 3; Corfu Channel, 1947–1948 I.C.J. 124, ¶ 1. 
In Gulf of Maine, the court was required to commission an expert to assist in the determi-
nation of the maritime boundary dividing the fisheries zones of Canada and the United 
States of America by a special agreement between the parties. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 
165, ¶ 3. 
77 See Corfu Channel, 1947–1948 I.C.J. 124, ¶ 1. 
2011 ICC-Commissioned Independent Experts and Environmental Disputes 77 
agents could have actually seen the ships approach the mines in 
enough time to warn the Royal Navy of the minefield.78 In establishing 
the facts of the case, the court repeatedly relied on the expert opinion 
and noted such expert opinion provided technical information “that 
might guide [the court] in its search for the truth,” as the experts were 
able to provide “correct and impartial information” after examining 
the data and visiting the relevant locations.79 
 In the Pulp Mill dispute, the judges drew conclusions from the 
technical environmental data provided by the parties, but the majority 
opinion and dissenting opinions diverged on their legal conclusions 
because of their inconsistent reliance on the data.80 Judge Vinuesa, in 
his dissenting opinion, questioned the court’s ability “to draw solid and 
justified conclusions of law” from disputed data that contained numer-
ous factual discrepancies.81 For example, Judge Vinuesa drew different 
conclusions, from the same data, disagreeing with the majority by con-
cluding that Argentina’s “extensive data,” including satellite imagery, 
provided clear evidence that the mill contributed to the 2009 algal 
blooms.82 
 Consequently, the Pulp Mill case is analogous to Corfu Channel be-
cause both are disputes requiring legal conclusions to be drawn from 
complex and technical facts that are beyond the justices’ professional 
competencies.83 Because Corfu Channel shows that the ICJ can commis-
sion expert enquiry when essential facts are in dispute, the justices in 
Pulp Mill had a mechanism available to verify the complex facts.84 Thus, 
the ICJ should have clarified and substantiated the parties’ data, as it 
did in Corfu Channel, before making environmental and legal conclu-
sions on the admittedly deficient data.85 
B. “Sustainable Development” Demands Stronger Scientific Analysis 
 The use of independent expert enquiry would have allowed the 
ICJ to truly capture the essence of sustainable development in its deci-
                                                                                                                      
78 See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 9–10, 13. 
79 See id. at 20, 21. 
80 Compare Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 243, with Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 69 (Vinuesa, J., dissenting), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/135/15893.pdf. 
81 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 68 (Vinuesa, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. ¶ 80. 
83 See, e.g., Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. at 20 (inferring that the experts pro-
vided technical information that the justices could not have provided). 
84 See, e.g., id. at 14. 
85 See Corfu Channel, 1947–1948 I.C.J. 124, ¶ 1. 
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sion. The majority stated that because the Statute seeks optimum and 
rational utilization of the river, the parties had recognized that the 
agreement addressed both environmental concerns and national eco-
nomic development goals.86 Such an interpretation explains the ICJ’s 
belief that the procedural obligations and CARU promote sustainable 
development, requiring the parties to protect both environmental and 
economic rights.87 According to the majority, such balancing of eco-
nomic and environmental rights is the “essence of sustainable devel-
opment,” which is a principle that has previously influenced the ICJ.88 
In this case, however, the majority’s definition does not include all in-
ternationally accepted elements of “sustainable development” as the 
majority fails to recognize the rights and protection of both present 
and future generations.89 
 Generally, the international community defines sustainable devel-
opment as more than just a balancing of environmental and economic 
needs, and includes the belief that sustainable development must rec-
ognize and protect future generations.90 Under that definition, there is 
an emphasis on identifying the impact of future environmental harms, 
which would require the ICJ to examine not just historical and current 
data, but also future projections.91 
 In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ balanced the parties’ envi-
ronmental and economic objectives as just one means for incorporat-
ing the principle of sustainable development into their judgment.92 In 
that case, the ICJ was asked to decide whether environmental and eco-
logical harms excused Hungary from refusing to complete a hydroelec-
tric project on the parties’ border, the River Danube, in violation of a 
bilateral agreement.93 The ICJ recognized, in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Pro-
ject, that sustainable development requires examination of the effects 
                                                                                                                      
86 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 175. 
87 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Order of 13 July 2006, 2006 I.C.J. 113, ¶ 80. 
This also may explain why Uruguay’s second claim, in its “counter-memorial,” argued that 
any court order to dismantle the Botina Mill would “harm . . . the Uruguay economy in 
terms of lost jobs and revenue.” See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 22. 
88See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 177. 
89See id. ¶ 265. 
90See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Ja-
niero, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
91 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 141 (Cancado Trindade, J., dis-
senting), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15885.pdf. 
92 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), Judgment of 25 Sept. 1997, 1997 
I.C.J. 7, ¶ 140. 
93 See id. ¶ 33, ¶¶ 143–146. 
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on the quality of life and health of both present and future generations 
as it attempts to resolve the tension between the parties’ environmental 
and economic priorities.94 
 In Pulp Mill, Justice Weeramantry’s separate opinion further ex-
plains the principle of sustainable development as a part of customary 
international law.95 He recommends that the ICJ incorporate sustain-
able development into their judgment by balancing economic and en-
vironmental harms, looking beyond static historical data and giving 
weight to the future environmental impacts on humanity.96 Further, in 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, both parties recognized that the principle 
of sustainable development was applicable to their dispute and looked 
to international sources to define the term, including the Rio Declara-
tion on the Environment and Development.97 The Rio Declaration was 
also cited by Argentina, in the Pulp Mill dispute, as an international 
statement expressing the parties’ obligation to protect the environ-
ment.98 The Declaration, which affirms the U.N. member states’ com-
mitment to balancing economic and environmental goals, expresses 
that sustainable development requires balancing “developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.”99 
 In the present case, the majority incorrectly claimed that it cap-
tured the “essence” of sustainable development, failing to incorporate 
any discussion of impact on future generations into its decision.100 The 
majority drew legal conclusions from historical data and did not indi-
cate whether they had evaluated whether the parties’ environmental 
impact assessments examined future environmental impacts.101 There-
fore, because the majority did not determine the impact on future gen-
erations it failed to fully uphold the principle of sustainable develop-
ment.102 However, had the ICJ sincerely attempted to reach legal 
                                                                                                                      
94 See id. ¶ 53. 
95 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. at 7, 88, 103–04 (separate opin-
ion of Vice Pres. Weermantry). 
96 See id. at 114, 118 (urging the court not to uphold an obviously harmful environ-
mental practice just because a twenty-year-old treaty allowed such practices). 
97 Id. at 90. 
98 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 106 (Cancado Trindade, J., dissent-
ing). 
99 Rio Declaration, supra note 90, arts. 1, 3, 16. 
100 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment, ¶ 177. 
101 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 239, 250 (examining dissolved oxygen and phosphates). 
102 Compare Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 53 (acknowledging 
that safeguarding ecological balance is an essential interest of all States with significance 
for present and future generations), with Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment ¶¶ 239, 
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conclusions that captured the essence of sustainable development it 
would have used Article 50 to commission an independent enquiry and 
asked the experts to analyze the mill’s impact on future generations.103 
Conclusion 
 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay identifies current systemic weak-
nesses in the ICJ’s approach to complex environmental disputes. For 
the ICJ to reach reliable legal conclusions it cannot simply draw conclu-
sions only from the attorneys’ submissions and unsubstantiated, con-
tradictory data. If the ICJ truly sought to provide a conclusive determi-
nation of the actual and future environmental impact of the Botina 
Mill, with due regard to Uruguay’s substantive obligations, then the 
court should have used its power to request additional expert testimony 
from the parties or commissioned independent expert enquiry. These 
additional submissions would have substantiated some of the parties’ 
submissions and verified the data from which the ICJ could best draw 
legal conclusions. Additionally, the ICJ could have directed experts to 
analyze the long-term impacts of the mill in light of the principle of 
sustainable development. Instead, the ICJ reached its legal determina-
tion—allowing the mill to continue to operate—without ensuring pro-
tection of the “quality of life of both present and future generations.” 
                                                                                                                      
250 (examining only past dissolved oxygen and phosphate levels without discussing future 
long-term impacts). 
103 See Rules of Court, supra note 4, arts. 62, 67. 
